Expert Testimony and the Epistemology of Disagreement by Stein, Alex
STEIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018 2:25 PM 
 
1199 
Expert Testimony and the Epistemology of 
Disagreement 
Alex Stein* 
Before I begin, I would like to thank Michael Risinger and the Seton 
Hall Law Review for the opportunity to present my Comment at this 
wonderful symposium.  Under the taxonomy used in my favorite sport—
soccer—this opportunity is a hat-trick: it makes me feel blessed, honored, 
and lucky.  I feel blessed because this symposium is a rare occasion that pays 
tribute to a truly remarkable evidence scholar, Michael Risinger, whose 
writings have advanced the understanding of the discipline as a socially 
important subset of applied epistemology.1  I feel honored because I am 
about to comment on the work of another distinguished and exceptionally 
prolific scholar of evidence, Ed Imwinkelried.2  I feel lucky because the work 
I am going to comment on intersects with my current interest in the 
epistemology of disagreement.3 
*** 
Professor Imwinkelried ties post-conviction relief to discreditation of a 
forensic expert’s testimony that helped the prosecution prove the defendant’s 
guilt.  Specifically, he argues that “an accused ought to be entitled to a new 
trial when: (1) the accused presents testimony about a new analytic technique 
developed in subsequent scientific research; (2) that technique yields a 
different outcome than the expert technique used at the prior trial; and (3) 
the validation of the new technique is so extensive that it either discredits the 
 
*Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  I thank Michel Risinger and Gideon 
Parchomovsky for their comments on an earlier draft. 
1   For contributions that influenced my thinking about evidence law and epistemology, 
see D. Michael Risinger, The Irrelevance, and Central Relevance, of the Boundary Between 
Science and Non-Science in the Evaluation of Expert Witness Reliability, 52 VILL. L. REV. 
679 (2007); D. Michael Risinger, et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects 
in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1 
(2002) (explaining how subjective human judgment enters into forensic findings and how to 
block this influence). 
 2   Edward J. Imwinkelried, Debunked, Discredited, but Still Defended Revising State 
Post-Conviction Relief Statutes to Cover Convictions Resting on Subsequently Invalidated 
Expert Testimony, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1095 (2018). 
 3   See generally Alex Stein, Law and the Epistemology of Disagreement, 96 WASH. U. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3070697.  
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prior expert testimony or seriously undermines confidence in its 
correctness.”4  From a normative standpoint, granting that “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” is a right standard for findings of guilt,5 this argument is 
undeniably correct.  Professor Imwinkelried also discusses more difficult 
cases in which “new scientific evidence creates grave doubts about the 
accuracy of the prior conviction but falls short of demonstrating the 
accused’s undeniable innocence.”6  According to him, in these cases “the 
courts and legislatures have a far more difficult policy choice; they must 
weigh the competing interests in accuracy and finality.”7  These cases are 
hard because the new science does not “shake our confidence in the 
conviction”8 and whether it should “trump the substantial public interest in 
finality of judgment”9 is unclear. 
In this Article, I will try to shed some light on these hard cases. 
I 
The paradigmatic hard-case scenario involves two forensic experts: 
Expert G, whose testimony suggests that the defendant is guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and Expert I, who testifies that the defendant might be 
innocent.  Expert G testifies as a prosecution witness at the defendant’s trial 
to secure the defendant’s conviction.  Expert I testifies at the defendant’s 
post-conviction hearing (or submits an affidavit in support of the defendant’s 
petition for post-conviction relief).  Such cases are considered hard for the 
“floodgate” type of reason.  Allowing Expert I to reopen the defendant’s 
conviction and force out a retrial would make post-conviction relief available 
to all similarly situated defendants.  Many defendants would be able to find 
Expert I whose testimony would cast doubt on the forensic analysis of Expert 
G and obtain post-conviction relief.  This will undercut the social interest in 
the finality of guilty verdicts. 
This argument is facially appealing, but I believe that it is 
fundamentally flawed.  Similarly to many other allusions to a floodgate, it 
 
 4   Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1136. 
 5   For criticism of this conventional standard, see LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND 
CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 29, 63 (2006) (arguing that the “beyond 
a reasonable doubt” standard allows for too many erroneous acquittals that may lead to 
socially devastating consequences); Larry Laudan, Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, 9 
LEGAL THEORY 295 (2003) (arguing that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement is 
dysfunctional); Larry Laudan, Is it Finally Time to Put ‘Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt’ 
Out to Pasture? (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Series No. 194, 2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815321 (criticizing the wrongful conviction versus wrongful 
acquittal tradeoff contemplated by the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard). 
 6   Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1136. 
 7   Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1137. 
 8   Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1137. 
 9   Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1137. 
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does not only make the floodgate prediction, but also identifies the gate that 
needs to be locked to prevent the floodgate.  Additionally, the argument 
makes a convoluted assumption that the floodgate problem cannot be 
prevented by closing a different gate ahead of time.10  As I will show, this 
tacit and consequently unexamined assumption turns out to be false.  Cases 
identified by Professor Imwinkelried as hard are the consequence of the 
Daubert rule that allows factfinders to base a defendant’s conviction on 
defeasible forensic testimony.11  Most of those cases could be eliminated if 
our system were to follow the rigid Frye standard that renders inadmissible 
expert testimony not fully supported by scientific consensus.12  By the “rigid 
Frye standard,” I mean the requirement that a forensic expert’s methodology 
and its application to the facts of the individual case follow scientific 
procedures that received an enduring and widespread recognition in the 
expert’s professional community.13 
My prior work supported this standard on moral grounds: I argued that 
Frye is the only rule that aligns with what I called the “equal best” 
 
 10   This logical flaw is present in many, of not all, theories that allude to “floodgates” and 
“slippery slopes.”  See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1026, 1030–31 (2003) (demonstrating that the validity of “slippery slope” claims 
critically depends on the comparison between all available ways of preventing the feared bad 
consequence).  Cf. David Enoch, Once You Start Using Slippery Slope Arguments, You’re on 
a Very Slippery Slope, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 629 (2001) (arguing that “slippery slope” 
arguments are self-defeating because decision-makers who fear that Decision A, otherwise 
preferable to alternatives, will increase their probability of making wrong distinctions down 
the road, should be equally skeptical about their current ability to distinguish between valid 
and invalid “slippery slope” claims; and so by failing to make Decision A and act upon it, they 
will put themselves on yet another, equally damaging, slippery slope).   
 11   See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 12   See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also 1 Charles 
Tilford McCormick et al., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 827, § 203 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th 
ed. 2006) (explaining that the Frye standard requires the proponent of an expert’s testimony 
to “show that the scientific community agrees that the principles or techniques on which the 
expert relies are capable of producing accurate information and conclusions.”).  Under this 
standard, expert testimony not aligning with conventional wisdom is not admissible.  See id. 
at 828 (giving examples of novel scientific findings that “have fallen prey to [Frye’s] 
influence”).  
 13   For illustrations of the strict version of Frye, see Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536, 550 
(Fla. 2007) (“In utilizing the Frye test, the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove 
the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures 
used to apply that principle to the facts of the case at hand.” (quoting Ramirez v. State, 651 
So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995))); Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 857 N.E.2d 1114, 1119–20 (N.Y. 
2006) (“[T]he Frye test asks ‘whether the accepted techniques, when properly performed, 
generate results accepted as reliable within the scientific community generally.’” (citation 
omitted) (quoting People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 (N.Y. 1994))); State v. Gregory, 
147 P.3d 1201, 1238 (Wash. 2006) (“Washington has adopted the Frye test for evaluating the 
admissibility of new scientific evidence. . . . Both the scientific theory underlying the 
evidence and the technique or methodology used to implement it must be generally accepted 
in the scientific community for evidence to be admissible under Frye.” (citing State v. Gore, 
21 P.3d 262, 271–72 (Wash. 2001))).  
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requirement for allocating the risk of wrongful conviction.14  This 
requirement mandates that the state afford criminal defendants the best 
feasible protection against erroneous conviction while keeping that 
protection equal for all defendants.15  In this Article, I take a different tack.  
Specifically, I rely on the epistemology of disagreement to support the claim 
that defendants should be granted a retrial in cases identified by Professor 
Imwinkelried as hard.  As a corollary, I argue that all inculpatory forensic 
evidence should satisfy the rigid Frye standard to be admissible.  This 
discussion introduces some refinements into Professor Imwinkelried’s 
analysis of the Texas and California statutes that address the problem at 
hand.16 
II 
The epistemology of disagreement is a rapidly developing subset of 
normative epistemology.17  It focuses on disagreement among peers and its 
rational effects on the underlying decision.18  Specifically, it examines two 
 
 14   ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 196–97 (2005). 
 15   Id. at 172–78. Professor Laudan, supra note 5, at 131, criticizes the “equal best” 
standard for being overbroad. Specifically, he argues that the best protection against erroneous 
conviction must completely eliminate an innocent defendant’s risk of being found guilty. 
Under this level of protection, the legal system has no choice but to acquit each and every 
defendant—a consequence that also makes the “equal” element of my proposed standard 
conceptually redundant. See also Larry Laudan, The Elementary Epistemic Arithmetic of the 
Law II: The Inadequate Resources of Moral Theory for Dealing with the Criminal Law *6, 
n.3 (U. of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 193, Apr. 19, 2011), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1815311 (“This principle of Stein’s seems to be redundant on its 
face. If its first clause is satisfied, namely, if the state genuinely did its best to protect a 
defendant from false conviction, the possibility would not arise that it gave better protection 
to some other defendant since the latter situation, if it occurred, would gainsay the claim that 
the state had done its best for the former defendant.”). This criticism misrepresents the “equal 
best” standard. This standard does not call for a complete elimination of erroneous 
convictions. Rather, it requires that the state do its practical best at protecting defendants 
against erroneous conviction and that this level of protection be the same for all defendants. 
Under this standard, courts would not be authorized to convict a defendant in the presence of 
evidence pointing to his possible innocence until this evidence is discredited. Evidence 
identifying the defendant as a perpetrator of the alleged crime, on the other hand, will suffice 
for the defendant’s conviction despite any theoretical doubt unsubstantiated by the evidence. 
See STEIN, supra note 14, at 173, 175. The equality requirement here serves an important goal: 
it requires the legal system to set up general rules of evidence and procedure in order to 
prevent unfairness to individual defendants whose protection against false convictions would 
otherwise be completely dependent on the judges’ and the jurors’ discretion. 
 16   See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1131–34 (discussing West’s Ann. Cal. Penal Code 
§ 1473(e)(1) and Vernon’s Ann. Texas C.C.P. Art. 11.073). 
 17   See Richard Feldman, Reasonable Religious Disagreements, in PHILOSOPHERS 
WITHOUT GODS: MEDITATIONS ON ATHEISM AND THE SECULAR LIFE 194 (Louise M. Antony, 
ed. 2007) (explaining epistemological significance of disagreements). 
 18   See generally David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey, Introduction, in THE 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT: NEW ESSAYS 1, 1–3 (David Christensen & Jennifer 
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big questions.  First, should a person revise her decision after learning that a 
similarly situated decision-maker—an “epistemic peer”— disagrees with it?  
Second, and relatedly, does the fact that an equally informed and competent 
decision-maker disagrees with the person’s decision reduce the decision’s 
reliability?19 
Consider two friends, Georgina and Ian, who agree to have lunch 
together and split the check.  At the end of the meal, the waiter brings the 
check to the table.  Georgina and Ian examine the check that subsequently 
disappears from the table.  Asking the waiter to bring a new check is against 
social etiquette.  Based on what she saw on the check, Georgina calculates 
that she and Ian must pay $26 each for the meal.  She tells Ian about it, but 
Ian informs her that, based on his recollection, each must pay $30.  Can 
Georgina justifiably refuse to modify her decision?20 
Arguably, Georgina cannot justifiably refuse to do so.21  She and Ian 
were exposed to the same objective information about the cost of the meal.  
Presumably, Ian’s memory and capacity to make simple algebraic 
calculations are not inferior to Georgina’s.  All this makes Ian Georgina’s 
epistemic peer.22  Ian’s disagreement with Georgina consequently constitutes 
evidence that requires Georgina to revise her belief.  Since she and Ian were 
equally likely to miscalculate the amount to be paid, each of them should 
leave $28 on the table.23  At a minimum, Ian’s disagreement with Georgina 
should make her less confident about her original belief.24 
The fact that a person’s epistemic peer disagrees with her decision is 
best conceptualized as second-order evidence.25  Second-order evidence is a 
broad category: it includes any information pertaining to the reliability of the 
primary, first-order, evidence that supports the person’s factual findings. 
From this perspective, Ian’s disagreement with Georgina constitutes second-
 
Lackey, eds., 2013) (outlining issues focused upon by epistemologists of disagreement). For 
excellent surveys of the literature, see Jonathan Matheson, Disagreement and Epistemic 
Peers, in OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE: SCHOLARLY RESEARCH REVIEWS (2015), 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.001.0001/oxfor
dhb-9780199935314-e-13?rskey=yxQfUL&result=1; David Christensen, Disagreement as 
Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy, 4 PHIL. COMPASS 756 (2009). 
 19   See supra notes 17–25 and sources cited therein. 
 20   This example draws on David Christensen, Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good 
News, 116 PHIL. REV. 187, 193–94 (2007). 
 21   See Christensen & Lackey, supra note 18, at 2. 
 22   See Matheson, supra note 18, at 2–3. 
 23   This adjustment follows the “equal weight” principle for resolving peer disagreements. 
See Adam Elga, Reflection and Disagreement, 41 NOÛS 478, 484–90 (2007). 
 24   See Christensen, supra note 20, at 193. 
 25   See Richard Feldman, Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement, 6 
EPISTEME 294, 295 (2009) (“[E]vidence of peer disagreement is False higher-order 
evidence—evidence about the significance of one’s first-order evidence.”); Matheson, supra 
note 18, at 5–6. 
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order evidence that reduces the reliability of Georgina’s factual finding about 
the requisite payment.  It indicates that Georgina may have miscalculated the 
payment or, alternatively, missed something when she looked at the check.  
Hence, if Georgina is interested in making an epistemically justified 
decision, she ought to account for these possibilities and update her initial 
view accordingly.  From an epistemological standpoint, not doing so would 
be unjustified, if not altogether irrational.  If Georgina could justifiably 
ignore Ian’s calculation, then Ian, too, could justifiably stick to his guns after 
hearing from Georgina that each side should pay the restaurant $26, as 
opposed to $30.  Consequently, both Ian’s and Georgina’s decisions would 
be deemed justified, which is patently absurd.  One of those decisions, if not 
both of them, must be wrong. 
There is no consensus among epistemologists as to how a peer’s 
disagreement with a person’s decision should affect that decision.  Some 
epistemologists take a non-conciliatory, or steadfast, approach to peer 
disagreements.26  Under this approach, a peer’s disagreement with a person’s 
rational belief does not require the person to revise that belief.27  Other 
epistemologists adopt a conciliatory approach to peer disagreements,28 under 
which a peer’s disagreement ought to be accounted for as second-order 
evidence that reduces the person’s level of confidence in her own belief.29  
Facing a peer’s dissent, the person must assume that her belief or decision 
may have some flaws that she failed to notice.  This assumption makes the 
person’s belief or decision less dependable than it would have been if it faced 
no dissenters. 
The steadfast approach is particularly appropriate for cases in which a 
person can rationally claim to have an unshakable, or categorical, belief that 
comes close to what epistemologists identify as “knowledge.”30  Holders of 
such beliefs need no second-order evidence that could tell them how reliable 
those beliefs are.  The reason is obvious: those beliefs are reliable.  Second-
order evidence that confirms a person’s justified categorical belief gives the 
person no useful information; and so it is redundant.  And when second-order 
 
 26 See, e.g., Thomas Kelly, The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement, in OXFORD 
STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY 167 (John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler, eds., 2005) (arguing for 
the steadfast approach). 
 27 See, e.g., Ralph Wedgwood, The Moral Evil Demons, in DISAGREEMENT 216, 228 
(Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield, eds., 2010). 
 28 See Elga, supra note 23; Feldman, supra note 17; Feldman, supra note 25; Christensen, 
supra note 18; Christensen, supra note 20; Matheson, supra note 18. 
 29 See Feldman, supra note 25, at 295; Matheson, supra note 18, at 5–6; Stein, supra note 
3.  
 30   See generally ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION 3 (1986) 
(“Epistemologists have traditionally been interested in whether beliefs about the world are 
justified or warranted; whether we are rationally entitled to these beliefs. Epistemologists seek 
to discover or invent proper methods of inquiry and investigation. . .”).  
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evidence (say, an epistemic peer’s disagreement) indicates that the person’s 
justified categorical belief might be false, this indication is not credible and 
the person will consequently do well to ignore it. 
To see why, consider again the restaurant example, but assume this time 
that Georgina is absolutely confident that the check amount and the 
customary gratuity total $52, which means that she and Ian should pay $26 
each.  Under this assumption, Georgina should disregard Ian’s dissent 
because she knows that Ian is wrong.  Before rejecting Ian’s dissent, 
however, Georgina will do well to verify that her memorized observation 
and calculation could not somehow go wrong.  For example, if some of her 
past memorized observations or simple mathematical calculations turned out 
to be false, she could not justifiably hold a categorical belief that she and Ian 
should pay the waiter $52.  However, if her observations and memory never 
failed her in the past and her calculations were always accurate as well, 
Georgina would have enough rational grounds to assume that her current 
observation memory and calculation are accurate as well.31  Georgina’s view 
that she and Ian must pay the waiter $26 each would then come close to what 
epistemologists call a “justified true belief.”32 
Assume now that Georgina forms a defeasible belief that she and Ian 
must pay the waiter $52.  That is, Georgina is fairly confident about the 
amount she and Ian should pay, but she is also aware of the possibility that 
she misperceived or forgot the check amount, or miscalculated the gratuity.  
Under this scenario, it would be epistemically unjustified, if not downright 
irrational, for Georgina to take the steadfast approach as it might lead her to 
a wrong decision.33  Holders of defeasible beliefs, therefore, should account 
for second-order evidence indicating how reliable their beliefs are.34 
III 
These epistemological insights have profound implications for expert 
testimony.  Forensic experts testifying in criminal trials are epistemic peers 
who base their testimony on roughly (if not completely) the same 
information.  Consequently, one expert’s testimony should generally count 
as second-order evidence for another expert. 
When Expert G and Expert I disagree with each other, each expert must 
 
 31   See Stein, supra note 3. 
 32   See Stein, supra note 3. 
 33 Cf. David Enoch, Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too 
Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement, 119 MIND 953, 994 (2010) (arguing that a person’s 
rational choice between the steadfast and conciliatory approaches depends, inter alia, on 
“other things [the person justifiably] believe[s], on other evidence [she has] [and] on the 
epistemic methods [she is] justified in employing . . .”). 
 34   See Stein, supra note 3. 
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clarify to the court whether her findings are categorical or defeasible.  If the 
expert claims her findings to be categorical, she must state the reasons for 
making that assessment.  These reasons must be strong enough to make the 
expert’s findings a justified true belief.  Under these conditions, the expert’s 
findings will need no validation by second-order evidence and the expert can 
justifiably disregard the testimony of her dissenter. 
Consider an expert who calculates the chances of finding a random 
DNA match between blood recovered from a crime scene and the 
defendant’s blood sample according to the protocols accepted by DNA 
experts worldwide.  The expert’s testimony is accurate for all practical 
purposes.35  But it faces a dissenter who challenges the accepted DNA match 
calculation.  Under such circumstances, the expert need not heed the view of 
the dissenter who runs afoul of the accepted wisdom.  Contrariwise, it is the 
dissenter who should consider the accepted wisdom and the expert’s 
testimony as second-order evidence undermining the reliability of his 
findings. 
Think now of a forensic expert witness whose findings are defeasible.  
Those findings are about traces, fingerprints, bite marks or other matters over 
which experts may legitimately disagree.36  The expert faces a dissenter who 
disagrees with those findings.  In this case, the dissent should count as 
second-order evidence that must prompt the expert to reduce her level of 
confidence in her findings.  The expert would be epistemically wrong not to 
heed the dissent.  When an expert witness disregards the dissent, the court 
should tell the jury that there is a reason to discount the expert’s credibility. 
On similar grounds, a convicted defendant should become eligible for 
post-conviction relief when a previously unavailable expert witness 
identifies flaws in the defeasible forensic testimony that the prosecution used 
to secure his conviction.37  Any such defendant should be entitled to a new 
trial, if not to an acquittal.  Not granting relief will lead to wrongful 
convictions of innocent defendants. 
Using experts’ disagreement as a reason for granting post-conviction 
relief for defendants may seem extreme, but it is not.  The root problem here 
is not the broad availability of the post-conviction relief, but the wide-open 
 
 35   See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 668 
(2002) (noting the existence of scientific consensus about reliability of DNA evidence that 
satisfies conventional protocols). 
 36   See id. at 69–78; 210–19; 271–72 (describing controversies surrounding trace, 
fingerprint and bite mark evidence). 
 37   If the after-discovered expert evidence was discoverable at the time of the defendant’s 
trial, the defendant will do well to attack his conviction by invoking “the well-settled doctrine 
of ineffective assistance of counsel and cite favorable, recent precedents such as Hinton”. 
Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1104–05 (citing Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014)). 
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admissibility rule—the discretionary Daubert standard38—that allows the 
prosecution to rely on defeasible forensic findings.  To fix this problem, the 
legal system must do away with Daubert and reinstate, for all criminal cases, 
the strict version of Frye39—a rue that requires inculpatory expert testimony 
to fully align with scientific consensus as a firm prerequisite for 
admissibility.40 
With this in mind, I now offer some thoughts about Professor 
Imwinkelried’s analysis of the California and Texas post-conviction 
statutes.41  Circumstances under which the California statute grants a 
convicted defendant post-conviction relief include a case in which “[f]alse 
evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or 
punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to 
his or her incarceration.”42  For purposes of this provision, “‘false evidence’ 
includes opinions of experts. . .that have been undermined by later scientific 
research or technological advances.”43  This provision squarely aligns with 
California’s adoption of the Frye standard for admissibility of scientific 
evidence.44  When “later scientific research or technological advances” 
undermine forensic evidence that secured the defendant’s conviction, this 
evidence no longer enjoys standing recognition by the scientific community 
and thus, no longer satisfies the Frye standard.  Instead, it becomes 
defeasible.  In tune with the epistemological principles outlined in this 
Article, another expert’s disagreement with that evidence raises a reasonable 
doubt about the defendant’s guilt.45  Under such circumstances, the 
defendant has a rightful demand for a retrial, as also suggested by Professor 
Imwinkelried for reasons unrelated to Frye.46 
 
 38   See supra note 11. 
 39   See supra note 12. 
 40   Whether criminal defendants should be permitted to use exculpatory expert testimony 
that satisfies Daubert or an even lower standard in trying to raise a reasonable doubt about 
their guilt is a separate question.  I believe defendants have this entitlement under the Sixth 
Amendment Compulsory Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  See Alex Stein, Inefficient 
Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423, 460-69 (2015). 
 41   See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1131–34 (discussing Cal. Penal Code § 1473(e)(1) 
and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 11.073). 
 42   CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(b)(1) (West 2017). 
 43   Id. § 1473(e)(1). 
 44 See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (adopting Frye’s general 
acceptance standard in California law); People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 324–31 (Cal. 1994) 
(reaffirming applicability of Kelly-Frye doctrine in California courts and declining to switch 
to Daubert). 
 45 See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.   
 46 Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1100. The California statute also provides that the 
prosecution expert’s repudiation of her own testimony makes the defendant entitled to a new 
trial. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1). Professor Imwinkelried criticizes that provision for 
being “too liberal” because a witness’s “recantation of prior testimony is not a ground for 
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Under the Texas statute, a convicted defendant can successfully apply 
for post-conviction relief when new expert research “contradicts scientific 
evidence relied on by the state at trial.”47  Unlike California courts, Texas 
courts follow the Daubert standard in admitting scientific evidence.48  This 
standard makes defeasible forensic testimony admissible for both 
inculpatory and exculpatory purposes.49  Under the epistemology of 
disagreement principles, when defeasible forensic testimony is contradicted 
by another expert equally informed of the relevant facts, its probative value 
is diminished.50  This disagreement is sufficient in and of itself for raising a 
reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt. 
Professor Imwinkelried views the “contradiction” requirement as “too 
restrictive.”51  According to him, “‘Contradict’ would probably subsume 
situations in which the later research altogether discredits the earlier 
testimony.”52  In my opinion, this restrictive interpretation is unlikely to be 
adopted by Texas courts.  These courts seem to prefer the ordinary meaning 
of “contradict” that refers to another witness’s express or implicit denial of 
the “contradicted” testimony.53  There is no requirement for full disproof. 
Both California and Texas post-conviction statutes thus fully align with 
sound epistemological principles.  I agree with Professor Imwinkelried’s 
assessment of the California system of science-driven post-conviction relief 
as superior to the Texas system, but my reasons are different from his.  The 
California system is better than Texas’s not because it gives convicted 
defendants better post-trial opportunity to attack questionable forensics.  
This system is superior because it disqualifies questionable forensics at the 
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 48 See E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995) 
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 49 See Jordan, 928 S.W.2d at 555 (noting that under the Kelly-Daubert multifactor test, 
expert testimony only needs to have a “basis in sound scientific methodology” to be 
admissible). 
 50 See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text. 
 51 Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1132. 
 52 Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1132. 
 53 See, e.g., Hudson v. State, 112 S.W.3d 794, 801 (Tex. App. 2003). 
 54 See supra note 44 and cases cited therein. 
